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1. Introduction

25

The study of conflict in management began at the field’s inception with Dubin (1957) observing power conflicts

26

between labor unions and managers within organizations. Thompson (1960) brought the study of conflict to the

27

forefront when he observed that conflict is something ever-present in organizations and is to be avoided and controlled.

28

Cyert and March’s (1963) seminal book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, built on Thompson’s ideas, observing that conflict

29

stems from incompatible goals and information among people who constitute an organization. Litterer (1966) agreed

30

with Thompson, Cyert, and March on the ubiquity and often burdensomeness of conflict in organizational life, but also

31

noted that, because it “energizes people to activity” (p. 180), conflict can be a positive thing for organizations – especially

32

when innovation and change are wanted. Consequently, Litterer urged organizations, and those who study them, to find

33

ways to harness the good and avoid the bad of conflict. Pondy (1967) complemented Litterer’s work by observing that

34

conflict may be studied between or within organizations, suggesting that models of conflict may have different

35

assumptions and uses depending on the level of analysis. Since these early works, many fruitful research areas on conflict

36

arose; focusing on the positives and negatives conflict brings to organizations. Figure 1 provides an estimate of the rise

37

and steady state of conflict research in top-tier management journals.1

38

The management field studies conflict at different levels of analysis. Conflict can be studied within a person such

39

as when modeling role conflict (e.g. Rizzo et al., 1970) and cognitive dissonance (e.g. Festinger, 1962). Conflict can also

40

be studied among groups such as in the modeling of team competition (e.g. Johnson et al., 2006), network competition

41

(e.g. Das & Teng, 2002), and firm sustainability in resource-constrained environments (e.g. Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Lastly,

42

conflict can be studied within a group or a collective of agents who are interdependently connected (Sullivan, 2002)

43

such as in modeling team diversity and alliance cooperation (e.g. Jehn, 1995; Zeng & Chen, 2003).

44

The current review focuses on five models about conflict within a group or intragroup conflict. The models are

45

diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, social dilemma, social exchange, and transaction cost economics models.

46

There are several reasons for focusing on intragroup conflict models.2 First, while previous reviews focus primarily on

47

the negatives (e.g. Rubin et al., 1994) or positives of conflict (e.g. De Dreu & Van De Vliert, 1997), there is has been

48

little attempt to discuss complementarity among intragroup conflict models. The absence of such integration may be

49

because the models are used in distinct areas of management with little crosstalk. Second, the research that reviews
2

50

specific models of intragroup conflict is primarily descriptive in findings and not theoretical insights.3 It is therefore our

51

intention to highlight the foundational papers of the models reviewed and explain why the papers are critical and go

52

one step further by reviewing some of the most recent contributions to these models.

53

Taken together, the intragroup conflict models reviewed herein present several insights. The first is how conflict is

54

conceptualized. Conflict is a “dynamic process” whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition

55

toward another agent (Pondy, 1967). The ideas of conflict being a perception or feeling – coupled with the possibility

56

of it producing positive outcomes for organizations – distinguish management’s study of the topic from other fields’.

57

Whereas other fields – e.g. economics – consider an agent expending resources to harm another as a necessary condition

58

of conflict (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007), conflict as studied in management may be entirely a perception made by the

59

individual agent in addition to it “manifesting” through behavior (Pondy, 1967).

60

The second insight is that intragroup conflict does not always result in a negative outcome, providing some

61

additional parsimony between management’s study of the topic and other’s in the social sciences. Some disciplines –

62

e.g. international relations in political science – primarily view conflict as leading to negative outcomes (e.g. Levy &

63

Thompson, 2011). Indeed, intragroup conflict does have its negative effects between individuals – be they people or

64

organizations. As we shall discuss here, intragroup conflict is viewed primarily by social dilemma and transaction cost

65

economics models as resulting in negative outcomes. However, the field of management approaches conflict as a

66

contingency process that can benefit or harm an organization based on characteristics of that organization and its

67

members (Litterer, 1966).4 The contingency of conflict is in the type of conflict occurring among the parties and the

68

outcomes of these types of conflict can be positive, negative, or both. As shall be detailed in our discussion about

69

diversity-conflict, negotiation, and social exchange models, intragroup conflict can lead to positive or negative outcomes

70

for organizations.

71

Before we begin, however, we observe that conflict research in management is vast – with enough research to fill

72

multiple review volumes. The voluminous body of management scholarship on conflict developed from a field that is

73

a melting pot of scholars who develop and borrow theory from many disciplines in the social and natural sciences

74

(Ferraro et al., 2005); e.g. organizational theory, organizational behavior, strategy, sociology, psychology, economics,
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75

social psychology, industrial psychology, history, industrial relations, political science, anthropology, and evolutionary

76

biology. In management, any attempt to review every model of conflict in a single article would be futile.

77

To give the curious student a survey of the forest and not the trees, we review the five intragroup conflict models

78

most commonly studied in management. These five intragroup models were selected because they either “shifted” or

79

“created consensus” about findings in conflict research (Hollenbeck, 2008). Section 2 reviews the models, and Section

80

3 reviews the recent literature using those models. Section 4 provides future research directions, and Section 5 concludes

81

the review. Table 1 summarizes the main models of intragroup conflict and foundational papers.

82

2. Models of Intragroup Conflict

83

In the current section, we summarize the foundational papers for each model. The first two models reviewed are

84

often used to understand conflict within a group composed of people: diversity-conflict and behavioral-negotiation

85

models. The third is the social dilemma model and is used to study conflict either within a group of people or

86

organizations. The last two models – social exchange and transaction cost models – are often used to understand conflict

87

within a group of organizations.

88

2.1. Diversity-conflict Model

89

Diversity is defined as differences people perceive that separate themselves from others (Perry-Smith & Shalley,

90

2003). Such differences can be visible or invisible; e.g. race, gender, values, and work experience. Following Litterer

91

(1966), the diversity-conflict model assumes that conflict can be positive or negative for an organization contingent on

92

the characteristics of the task and individual members involved. Further, the diversity-conflict model assumes conflict

93

has several dimensions, and each dimension is a mechanism explaining the impact of work-team diversity on team

94

performance. The model created consensus from a mass of publications showing inconsistent relationships between

95

conflict and work-team performance, and it is based on three papers led by Karen Jehn. The Jehn papers show nuances

96

about the nature of conflict and its role in understanding diversity and team performance.

97

Jehn (1995). The first paper is Jehn’s (1995) field survey of workers in the logistics industry and examines two

98

dimensions of conflict in work teams: relational conflict and task conflict. Relational conflict is about interpersonal

99

incompatibility and includes annoyance, agitation, and hostility among teammates. Task conflict is about team member

100

incompatibility over ideas, the interpreting of information, and approaches to an organizational problem that the team
4

101

is facing (Jehn, 1995). Jehn (1995) found that team performance has an inverted-U relationship with task conflict: at low

102

and high levels of task conflict, team performance is low, while a moderate level of task conflict improves team

103

performance. Relationship conflict is robustly detrimental to team performance. Further, the nature of the task

104

moderated the intensity of the effects between the two conflict dimensions and team performance. In routine tasks,

105

teams that experienced either form of conflict did not perform well, but in non-routine tasks, moderated levels of task

106

conflict were a blessing, not a curse.

107

Jehn (1997). The second paper is Jehn’s (1997) case study of teams in a household-goods-moving organization.

108

Jehn (1997) examined the relationship between relationship and task conflict dimensions with team performance and,

109

more importantly, introduced the idea of process conflict. Process conflict is about incompatible preferences over how

110

a task should be performed; e.g. how resources are allocated, who does what, and when (Jehn, 1997). Jehn (1997)

111

introduced a new model of conflict with the different dimensions of conflict as antecedents, team performance as the

112

outcome, and a host of team characteristics as moderators. Like relational conflict, process conflict had strong negative

113

impact on team performance and teammate satisfaction. Process conflict ate up time the team could have used for the

114

task and created uncertainty among teammates, motivating them to leave the team. Process conflict’s effect on team

115

performance followed an inverted-J shape: low levels of process conflict provided direction and solidarity to the team

116

and consequently improved their performance, while medium and high levels of process conflict increasingly decreased

117

team performance and teammate satisfaction.

118

Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999). The final foundational paper of the diversity-conflict model is Jehn et al.’s

119

(1999) field study of work teams in the household-goods-moving industry. Jehn et al. (1999) linked team diversity

120

characteristics with team performance, using conflict dimensions as mediators. Team diversity characteristics included

121

social category characteristics (e.g. gender and race), informational characteristics (e.g. education and background), and

122

value characteristics; e.g. quantity versus quality and ends versus means. Jehn et al. (1999) found that information

123

diversity increased task conflict among teammates that positively affected team performance. Second, value diversity

124

increased relational conflict within the team that negatively affected team performance. Lastly, value diversity increased

125

process conflict among teammates that negatively affected teammate sentiments of team morale, intent to remain, and
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126

commitment. One process strategy that can be employed to resolve conflict among organizational members is

127

negotiation; however, as we shall see, what people should do in a negotiation is not the same as what they actually do.

128

2.2. Behavioral Negotiation Model

129

Negotiation is a strategic process for navigating conflict and is broadly defined as the process whereby two or more

130

parties decide what each will give and take in a relationship (Thompson, 2015). Within management, the dominant

131

model used to study negotiation is the behavioral negotiation model. An interpersonal model, the behavioral negotiation

132

model assumes the group of negotiators are bounded rationally in their cognitive abilities (Simon, 1982), leaving the

133

negotiators susceptible to cognitive biases triggered by their interaction with the opponents and the deal’s context. The

134

cognitive biases undermine the information sharing process between the parties, thereby impacting the value created

135

and claimed from the negotiation (Thompson, 1991). Like the diversity-conflict model, conflict is not seen as always

136

being a burden, but rather than opportunity for parties to create value that could not be achieved acting alone. The

137

pivotal works either introduced or integrated key ideas in negotiation from across several disciplines.

138

Walton and McKersie (1965). Until Walton and McKersie’s (1965) book, negotiation scholarship was primarily

139

descriptive and studied disparately in economics, political science, and labor relations. Little theory explained the various

140

findings in labor disputes, arbitration, contract law, and traditional buyer-seller bargaining. Walton and McKersie (1965)

141

introduced a central framework for thinking about negotiation by describing two different strategic approaches:

142

distributive versus integrative negotiation. Distributive approaches focus on claiming as much value as possible for

143

oneself and consist primarily of the use of threats and emotional appeals to influence counterparties to make

144

concessions. Integrative approaches focus on creating and claiming value and consist of sharing information about

145

interests and priorities and then finding tradeoffs to generate joint gains (Pruitt, 1981). Walton and McKersie’s (1965)

146

were consensus shifter, providing conflict scholars a package of context-specific models about how negotiators discover

147

and divide resources.

148

Pruitt and Rubin (1986). The second work is Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986) book Social conflict. Therein, Pruitt and

149

Rubin (1986) introduced the dual-concerns model. The dual-concern model maintains that a negotiator has concerns

150

for their own outcome and the other party’s. Contingent on the weight the negotiator places on each of these concerns

151

constitutes the strategy she will use during the negotiation process. Negotiators with a high concern for the other’s
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152

outcome and a low concern for themselves yield to requests from the opponent; when concern for the other and oneself

153

is high then a problem-solving approach is taken to reach a deal; should concern for the other and oneself be low then

154

it is predicted the negotiator will be disengaged from the negotiation; and lastly, when the concern for other is low and

155

high for the self then the negotiator will contend aggressively to further her interests. The power of the dual-concerns

156

model is not found in predicting negotiation outcomes, but rather in predicting the strategies negotiators use to achieve

157

those outcomes. Further, the value of dual-concerns model was the idea of perceptions other than the focal negotiator

158

when developing the now-popular behavioral negotiation model.

159

Neale and Northcraft (1991). The last contribution is Neale and Northcraft’s (1991) dual-party behavioral

160

negotiation model. In presenting the model, Neale and Northcraft (1991) synthesize a sizable body of disparate empirical

161

research into a model that predicts negotiation outcomes as a function of contextual and negotiator characteristics.

162

Their main proposition is that any negotiation outcome is a function of the context the negotiators find themselves in

163

and the characteristics of the negotiators themselves. Contextual characteristics are fixed elements of the negotiation

164

environment; e.g. payoff functions between the parties, time pressure, whether negotiation occurs through a third party,

165

or whether it occurs through a rich, compared to lean, media such as face-to-face versus text messaging. Negotiator

166

characteristics are visible behaviors such as mood and emotions, personality and physical appearance, communication

167

methods, and non-visible cognitions such as information processing and biases. Further, compared to contextual

168

characteristics, negotiator characteristics can be dynamic - as emotions, ways of communication, and information

169

processing can change over time. The elegance of Neale and Northcraft’s (1991) model is that research can be

170

categorized into one of these bins of characteristics.

171

2.3. Social Dilemma Models

172

Individual members of a group are often tempted to act in their own self-interest and profit from selfish choices,

173

even though the whole group is better off cooperating. Such situations, in which individual benefits conflict with

174

collective benefits, are called social dilemmas. The conflict between individual and collective rationality represents a

175

fundamental challenge that organizations continually face, involving multiple levels of social interaction. The key issue

176

surrounding social dilemmas is whether individuals can cooperate and prioritize the interest of the collective over the

177

personal benefit, and if so, how such cooperation and coordination can be achieved (e.g. Sally, 1995). Cooperation in
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178

social dilemmas is inherently difficult and risky. A traditional economic framework predicts that because rational

179

individuals always attempt to maximize one’s utility and make decisions that provide the greatest benefit in their highest

180

self-interest, cooperative solutions are unlikely or unstable (Luce & Raiffa, 2012). Like the models previously reviewed,

181

social dilemma models view conflict as being either a negative or positive thing. Each article below was instrumental in

182

developing the models of social dilemmas because they either were the first to introduce the model, create consensus

183

out of disparate findings about how social dilemmas are solved, or shift consensus about how we think about conflict

184

in social dilemmas.

185

Dawes (1980). Dawes (1980) introduced the idea of social dilemmas and identified two outcome-relevant

186

properties of them: (a) everyone receives the highest payoff for a selfish choice regardless of others’ choices, and (b)

187

everyone ends up receiving a lower payoff if all choose to defect rather than to cooperate. Therefore, a social dilemma

188

is marked by a deficient equilibrium in which everyone has dominating strategies. Dawes coined the concept of the n-

189

person prisoner’s dilemma by introducing “give some” and “take some” games.5 To the extent that social dilemmas

190

involve interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, one way of eliciting cooperation is changing payoffs by introducing

191

rewards and punishments. Dawes (1980) argues that this simple approach however raises an important question of who

192

changes it and how to change it. The extent to which individuals value mutual benefits may be determined by other

193

influences, such as altruism, norms and conscience that are beyond a payoff structure and material outcomes.

194

Messick and Brewer (1983). In addition to n-person dilemmas, Messick and Brewer (1983) further discussed

195

interdependent interactions in a broader context in which self-interested behavior damages collective well-being. Social

196

traps indicate situations in which individuals pursue immediate gains that are seemingly beneficial, which in the long run

197

lead to a larger loss for the whole group. For example, if all members continue to exploit a common resource for their

198

individual benefit, the resources will eventually be depleted. On the other hand, social fences refer to situations in which

199

members of a group are tempted to avoid an immediate cost for collective benefits such that individuals’ inaction and

200

under-contribution hurt the group. They also discussed the temporal dimension of social dilemmas in which the

201

outcome of the action is delayed. In this review, two types of solutions to social dilemmas were suggested. The first

202

approach aims at influencing psychological and behavioral variables associated with actors’ cooperative behavior. For

203

example, communication is one of the prominent solutions under this category. Encouraging communication among
8

204

actors in social dilemmas allows them to exchange information about choices of others and creates a sense of group

205

identity and feelings of identification. The second type of the solutions focuses on interventions that change the

206

structural features of social dilemmas, such as the payoff structure and the group’s decision structure.

207

Kollock (1998). Kollock (1998) further divided solutions to social dilemmas into three broad types depending on

208

whether the solution assumes self-interested actors - motivational, strategic, and structural solutions. Motivational

209

solutions assume that individuals can take their partners’ outcomes into account. Strategic solutions assume egoistic

210

decision-makers and do not involve structural changes in social dilemmas. Because strategic solutions are contingent

211

upon the decision of actors that influence the outcome and behavior of their partners, such a solution is restricted to

212

repeated two-person dilemmas. For example, reciprocal or tit-for-tat strategies have been shown to maintain

213

cooperation in a two-person social dilemma. Finally, structural solutions involve changes in the rules of social dilemmas.

214

Specifically, Kollock (1998) highlighted the importance of creating or reinforcing structural features that can facilitate

215

strategic solutions. The use of monitoring and sanctioning systems can be implemented by using selective incentives

216

and punishments.

217

Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004). The last paper challenged how we think about conflict in social

218

dilemmas. The Weber et al. (2004) paper draws from James March’s (1994) idea of the logic of appropriateness to

219

provide alternative explanations for why people cooperate in social dilemmas. The appropriateness framework is more

220

about perceptions than calculations. The framework maintains that – in addition to weighing the costs and benefits of

221

a decision – individuals make decisions based on normative rules. Normative rules – e.g. “women and children first!” –

222

are followed as a function of a person’s perception of what the decision’s context is and what their role in that situation

223

is. In short, Weber et al. (2004) introduce the idea that individuals may not just ask “What are the positives and negatives

224

of me cooperating in this social decision problem?” but also ask “What does a person like me (role) do (rules) in a

225

situation like this (context)?” A core insight of the Weber et al. (2004) paper is that it suggests that the conflict between

226

individual and collective preferences in social dilemmas does not always lead to a negative outcome that needs structural

227

and psychological solutions (as maintained in the previous three reviewed papers); but rather can encourage people to

228

cooperate and achieve collective action as a function of how the social dilemma is framed.
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229

2.4. Social Exchange Model

230

The social exchange model approaches conflict among organizational groups out of effectiveness rather than

231

efficiency considerations. Specifically, the model crosses levels of analysis from between individuals and organizational

232

groups by assuming institutions and structures are negotiated through social interaction (Blau, 1964). Boundary spanning

233

role representatives behave and act, on behalf of their organizations, as decision makers based upon the norms, values

234

and constraints of their organization. In turn, the boundary spanners’ actions subsequently influence the collective

235

beliefs their organization holds towards the exchange partner (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Due

236

to its broad perspective on effectiveness, which may be gained by power, to enhancing conflict outcomes, social

237

exchange theory has become one the most prevalent paradigms in explaining conflict.

238

Through the lens of social exchange theory, conflict involves the friction between the interests of the powerful

239

maintaining their power over the interests of the less powerful seeking independence (Blau, 1964). As such, each person

240

has an expected cost-benefit ratio of each relationship, based on prior experiences (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If an

241

individual receives fewer benefits from a given relationship than expected or less than what they could obtain from

242

another, they will most likely terminate the relationship. A central tenet of this theory is the concept of reciprocity norm

243

(Gouldner, 1960), which is the expectation that individuals will treat others as they are treated. As such individuals

244

expect the benefits they have given to others will be paid back. There are caveats in which one party has more power

245

than the other and may force the opposing party to provide benefits with little reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). The weaker

246

party may be so dependent on scant benefits received from the more powerful party they must tolerate significant

247

inequity in benefits. Such imbalances in reciprocity identified by Blau (1964) have become known as power asymmetry.

248

The breadth of benefits from relationship exchanges may yield effective organizational arrangements through enhancing

249

outcomes such as power which yield control of other actors or resources, as well as reducing constraints in the external

250

environment (Grandori, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2003).

251

Unlike the models mentioned above, conflict from the social exchange perspective is viewed negatively for the

252

relationship as a whole, as well as the more dependent party. In contrast, conflict is largely viewed positively when the

253

result of the conflict yields increased power, whilst negatively for the party that becomes more dependent. Instabilities

254

in power are typically viewed as motives for terminating relationships, which might be viewed negatively if there is an
10

255

expectation of continuity (e.g. Polidoro et al., 2011). Broadly, this raises issues over sources of power which involve

256

access to resources, availability of alternatives, political coercion or legitimacy, and conflicting ideologies over resources

257

controlled by the powerful (Blau, 1964).

258

Emerson (1962). Emerson’s (1962) classic conceptualization of power defines it in relational terms, as a function

259

of an actor’s dependence on the other. The power of actor, Party A, over the other actor, Party B, formally, is defined

260

as the inverse of Party B’s dependence on Party A. Dependence may arise from the need for resources, organizational

261

size, and bargaining alternatives. Emerson (1962) clarified that power is not isolated to an individual or group but as a

262

relationship of one actor over another. Given the relative nature of power, it is important to consider who controls the

263

resource in question over those who are dependent on the resource (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). Further, Cook and

264

Emerson (1978) clarify that power may not only occur in a dyadic relation but also can occur amongst multiple actors

265

in a network.

266

Blau (1964). Social exchange theory was initially conceptualized through the lens of behaviorism (Homans, 1958).

267

However, it was Blau (1964) who took - what is now the most utilized approach - an economic and utilitarian perspective

268

to explain social exchange. Although, he conceived of behavior in terms of costs and rewards, Blau maintained that

269

behavior was determined by the rewards or costs the individual anticipates they will receive in the future rather than the

270

rewards they received in the past, which is the opposite of behaviorism. Blau (1964) also contributed to the theory by

271

establishing a link between micro-level behaviors and macro-level phenomena.6 Blau and Scott (1962) saw the firm

272

interacting in a context of an external environment consisting of an “organizational set”. Lastly, Blau (1964) defined

273

power as “the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence” (p. 117).

274

Blau (1964) also notes that relationships may exhibit equilibrium in one instance and yet face disequilibrium in others.

275

For example, a supplier firm might control access to a key input needed to the buying firm, exerting power over the

276

buying firm. However, the buying firm might be able to anticipate changes in the downstream market more quickly than

277

the supplier firm, negating the supplier firm’s influence and control in the long-term. Thus, both the stability and

278

instability of power become key areas of interest to social exchange theories.

279

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Social exchange theory evolved the study organizational conflict through resource

280

dependency theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Drawing on social exchange theory assumptions, resource
11

281

dependence seeks to understand why a firm may act beyond economic efficiency considerations. Firms manage the

282

costs and benefits of their relationships in a give-and-take (Scott & Davis, 2003). Resource dependence identifies three

283

important considerations. First, building on Blau and Scott’s (1962) idea of the “organizational set,” Pfeffer and Salancik

284

(1978) observe there is a social context in which organizations are responding to actions taken by other organizations.

285

Organizations are not independently making decisions in isolation from each other. Second, organizations may draw on

286

a much wider set of strategies to alleviate constraints in their environment beyond a binary market versus acquisition

287

governance choices. Firms invoke several social strategies such as using their board of directors, industry associations

288

and strategic alliances to manage their need for autonomy. Third, drawing on Emerson (1962) an organization becomes

289

effective and unconstrained by seeking power, rather than efficiency, to manage their external relationships. Scott and

290

Davis (2003, p. 234) summarize the goal of the resource dependency approach as “organizations should choose the

291

least constraining approach to coordinate relations with other organizations and to reduce the dependence that their

292

exchanges create.”

293

2.5. Transaction Cost Economics

294

Transaction cost economics has been broadly applied to study alliance relationships. Lumineau and colleagues

295

(2015) noted that the central concept of opportunism in transaction cost theory comports well as a model understanding

296

conflict among organizational groups due to its “emphasis on self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 6,

297

47). Specifically, without such noisy bargaining tactics, parties would coordinate on the open market efficiently, leaving

298

costlier forms of governance such as joint ventures and acquisitions as less desirable forms of organizing. Early

299

theorizing by Commons (1932, p. 4) also raised the link between conflict and transactions by suggesting that the unit of

300

analysis, the transaction, exhibits three conditions ‘mutuality, conflict and order’. Williamson (2000, p. 599) notes the

301

role of designing efficient forms of governance mechanisms are to “craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize

302

mutual gains.” Conflict would be largely viewed negatively in transaction cost economics due to the increased costs of

303

governance required to mitigate risks of opportunism. However, management scholars integrate transaction cost

304

approaches with other theories which might yield positive outcomes for firms through contracting capabilities (Argyres,

305

1996) as well as integrating trust into governance decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
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Coase (1937). Coase’s (1937) theorizing sought to answer the question of the nature of the firm. In a comparative

307

assessment between the firm and the market he asked, ‘why would firms exist?’ He defined a firm as “the system of

308

specialized relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur”

309

(p. 393). Such a definition brought forth a relative comparison between the actions of the entrepreneur organizing within

310

the boundaries of the firm versus the price available in the market. Specifically, Coase highlighted that under certain

311

conditions transactions may be more efficiently carried out by the firm than the market. He identified that bargaining

312

in the market might be costly due to uncertainty with writing contracts which may involve third-parties such as lawyers

313

as well as time taken to negotiate (Scott & Davis, 2003).

314

Williamson (1975). Williamson’s (1975) work on transaction cost economics is widely credited with giving the

315

theory empirical traction. Building on Coase’s (1937) comparison between market and hierarchy efficiencies, Williamson

316

(1981, p. 552) defines a transaction as an instance “when a good or service is transferred across a technologically

317

separable interface.” This allowed for a study of contracts, or verbal agreements, between actors, such as two

318

organizations’ respective boundary spanners, for the exchange of goods or services (Scott & Davis, 2003). The costs of

319

arranging contracts, such as planning and revising the agreement as well as overseeing the task through completion are

320

known as transaction costs. Williamson (1975) further identified three conditions under which small numbers bargaining

321

might arise increasing the costs for a transaction to take place in the market. First, Williamson, building on Coase’s

322

notion of uncertainty as well as incorporating ideas of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982), identified opportunism as a

323

source of conflict in exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This concern over behavioral uncertainty limits the extent to

324

which exchange partners can identify all possible contingencies from the exchange. Second, Williamson identified the

325

frequency of exchange, as the more often a transaction occurs with a partner the greater complexity and fewer

326

alternatives might be available (Williamson, 1979). Third, is the role of asset specificity, which limits the ability of the

327

partners to redeploy investments for alternate uses, thereby decreasing available bargaining partners. Because of the

328

inherent risks of vulnerability towards their exchange partner, the focal party making asset specific investments, will

329

seek safeguards to protect their self-interest in the exchange. These safeguards lead to costlier forms of governance such

330

as the use of hierarchies.

331
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3. Recent Trends about Conflict in Management

333

Here we examine the contributions to the conflict literature published in the last decade, drawing on the five conflict

334

models reviewed above. Because some topics straddle multiple domains in addition to management, several of our sub-

335

sections focus on specific papers while others use a host of papers that examine a specific trend.

336

3.1. Trends using the diversity-conflict model

337

Since Jehn’s seminal papers on conflict, management scholars have examined how the negative conflict dimensions

338

- relational and process conflict - can be mitigated to improve team performance. The trend begins with Greer et al.’s

339

(2011) field study of sales teams in the Dutch telecommunications industry. Greer et al. (2011) maintain that teams with

340

high power or influence in an organization will encourage its teammates to seek more power and to maintain the power

341

they have, competing with other power-hungry teammates. Consequently, teams in high power will experience more

342

inter-personal conflict and sub-par performance compared to those teams in low power. They found evidence for

343

relational and process conflict mediating the relationship between team power and performance. Further, the study

344

went on to find that power congruence, teammate perceptions of each other’s power within the team, dampens the

345

impact team power has on team conflict. They found that process conflict was present in high power teams only when

346

power congruence was low. In other words, managers can capitalize on powerful individuals working together in

347

organizations if they align perceptions of the pecking order among powerful teammates.

348

A second contribution is Nishii’s (2013) field study of workers in a biomedical firm. Nishii (2013) examines ways

349

to reduce relational and task conflict in gender diverse teams through a climate of inclusion. Climate of inclusion is an

350

individual’s perception that the team possesses fair procedures and distribution rules for rewards; an environment that

351

embraces differences and ways to resolve them; and a system that involves teammates in the team decision-making

352

process. Nishii (2013) found that the negative effect of social categorical diversity on relational diversity and subsequent

353

team performance was dampened when climate of inclusion was high compared to when it was low. A key insight here

354

is that managers can reduce the devastating effects of relational conflict on teams - not by encouraging homophily at

355

the team’s design - but by changing how current teammates perceive each other.

356

Another avenue of interest is how the leader perceives the team and their diversity. Tepper et al.’s (2011) field study

357

of supervisor-subordinate relations in hospitals examined the roles of perceived deep-level diversity in values and ways
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358

of approaching problems between the supervisor and subordinate, relational conflict, and work performance on

359

perceived abusive behavior from supervisors. They found that relational conflict mediated the positive relationship

360

between the supervisor’s perceived deep-level diversity and the subordinate’s perception of being abused by the

361

supervisor; however, this was only the case when the subordinate’s performance was low. In other words, the Tepper

362

et al. (2011) paper suggests that supervisors justify their ill treatment of subordinates who are different from them

363

primarily when they perceive the subordinates as poor performers.

364

Further, Klein and colleagues’ (2011) field study of volunteer humanitarian service teams in the USA investigated

365

how leader behaviors impacted the relationship between team value diversity and team effectiveness - with team conflict

366

as the mechanism. The authors examined whether different leadership types - i.e. task-oriented and person-oriented

367

leadership - would moderate the impact of diversity in work ethic and morals among teammates on team conflict, and

368

subsequent team performance. Leadership moderates the relationship between team diversity and performance through

369

team conflict, but it depends on the type of diversity and leadership approach. Leaders whose behaviors are heavily

370

task-oriented could reduce team conflict where there was high work-ethic diversity. Further, leaders whose behaviors

371

are heavily person-oriented could reduce team conflict in morally diverse teams. In either case, the leadership style’s

372

reduction of team conflict enabled diverse teams to perform better compared to when leaders exhibit little attention to

373

the task or the workers.

374

Lount et al. (2015) investigated whether a leader’s perceptions of categorical diversity in teams impacts their

375

willingness to provide requested resources to assist them in their tasks. The experiments report that leaders perceive

376

more relationship conflict in a racially diverse team compared to a homogeneous one, and the increased perception of

377

relationship conflict affects the leaders’ generosity in supplying resources. Lount et al. (2015) complements the other

378

papers by shifting the focus of inter-personal prejudice from the team to those looking from outside.

379

A new source of conflict in teams has generated a new conversation among management scholars: status conflict.

380

Bendersky and Hays’ (2012) study of MBA students introduce status conflict and examine its effect on team

381

performance. Status conflict occurs there are disagreements among teammates over their relative amount of respect

382

received in the team’s social hierarchy. Bendersky and Hays (2012) provide several insights to the conversation about

383

the diversity-conflict model. First, status conflict negatively affects team performance by discouraging information
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384

sharing among teammates. Also, team cooperativeness or the norm among teammates to communicate and work

385

together, attenuated the effect of status conflict on performance.

386

Building on Bendersky and Hays (2012), Anicich et al. (2015) examined the interaction between status and power

387

on interpersonal conflict in teams. They observe that the interpersonal conflict teams experience stems from the

388

interaction of perceptions teammates have about each other. Through a series of laboratory experiments and a field

389

survey of government workers, Anicich et al. finds that those with high power and low status in teams use their power

390

to abuse their low-power teammates compared to those teams with high status.

391

3.2. Trends using the behavioral negotiation model

392

The behavioral negotiation model separates negotiation influences into negotiator characteristics and contextual

393

characteristics. The three negotiator characteristics that receive the most attention are biases, emotions, and gender.

394

Three contextual characteristics that receive considerable attention are power, number of negotiating parties, and time.

395

3.2.1.

Negotiator characteristics

396

Biases. A substantial body of work in negotiations has looked at the role of cognition and biases in the negotiation

397

process. Such biases included anchoring (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and over-confidence (Neale & Bazerman, 1983).

398

While early research was focused on cognition (e.g. Bazerman & Neale, 1992), later research focused on motivational

399

biases. Egocentrism is a particularly pervasive bias in negotiation that leads negotiators to view themselves as entitled

400

to more resources than their counterpart (Loewenstein et al., 1989). Egocentrism is especially pronounced when power

401

is asymmetric (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) and this effect generalizes across cultures (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002a) and

402

generations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008). Further, egocentrism can skew people’s expectations of others’ behaviors in

403

negotiations (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Consistent with this finding, in a recent series of experiments, Chambers and De Dreu

404

(2014) showed strong evidence for the occurrence of egocentric misperception of the other side’s priorities and interests.

405

The studies showed that participants judged their own interests to be more important than their opponent’s, regardless

406

of the opponent’s interest. They found that perceptions of the opponent’s interests were often more closely related to

407

one’s own interests than to the opponent’s actual interests.

408

Emotions. Seminal research by Carnevale and Isen (1986) introduced emotion into negotiation research by

409

showing that negotiators experiencing positive affect were more cooperative and reached higher joint gains as opposed
16

410

to a control group. More recent scholarship has turned their attention to studying the benefits and burdens of negative

411

emotions. The expression of negative emotions - e.g. anger - in negotiations is found to produce lower joint gains (Antos

412

et al., 2011), covert retaliation (Wang et al., 2012), and reduced trust (Côté et al., 2013). Van Kleef et al. (2010) introduced

413

a model called Emotion as Social Information that predicts when anger and other negative emotions will lead to

414

concessions and when they will not. Specifically, when anger provides information about a negotiator’s own higher

415

limits, anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions (Van Kleef, et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Subsequent

416

research has shown how the model is contingent on other characteristics of the situation such as culture (Adam &

417

Shirako, 2013; Adam et al., 2010), whether the anger is viewed as authentic (Tng & Au, 2014), and the competitiveness

418

of the negotiation (Adam & Brett, 2015).

419

Scholars have also investigated more nuanced and contingent effects of emotion on negotiations. Sinaceur et al.

420

(2013) showed that when the negotiator expressed emotional inconsistency, the recipient made greater concessions than

421

when the negotiator expressed a consistent emotion. This was mediated by the recipient feeling less in control. Zhang

422

et al. (2014) found that certain emotions are seen more positively in conflict-resolution depending on cultural values.

423

Netzer et al. (2015) showed that negotiators try to increase an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to desirable

424

outcomes and try to decrease an emotion in others when they believe it will lead to undesirable outcomes. This occurred

425

even when the emotion made the other person feel worse, indicating that although inducing emotions in others can lead

426

to personal gain, it can also cause harm to others.

427

Gender. Gender affects interpretations of the negotiation, negotiation style, negotiation performance, self-

428

evaluation and self-worth, and the propensity to initiate negotiation. Women tend to interpret conflict situations in

429

relationship terms and men are more concerned with the exchange of resources (Pinkley, 1990). Men are more likely to

430

adopt a confrontational style and women are more likely to display communal focus and approaches (Tannen, 1990;

431

King & Hinson, 1994). Men are more likely to achieve higher gains on the distributive dimensions of negotiation

432

outcomes (Stuhlmacher & Walter, 1999), but women are better able to increase join gain (Kray & Thompson, 2005).

433

Women tend to engage in self-derogation during negotiation (Kimmel et al., 1980), expect to be paid less than men

434

(Major & Konar, 1984), and are less assertive than men for fear of backlash (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Finally,

435

women are less likely to engage in negotiation to begin with (Babcock et al., 2006).
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436

Recent research has sought to create consensus among inconsistencies regarding the role of gender differences in

437

negotiation styles. Faramand and Tu (2013) found that gender does not significantly affect business negotiation styles,

438

while social culture does. Bowles & Flynn (2010) found that women negotiators were more persistent with male

439

naysayers than female naysayers, but they persisted in a more indirect than direct manner. Leibbrandt and List (2015)

440

found that in the workplace, men will negotiate for a higher wage more often than women if there is no explicit statement

441

that wages are negotiable. If it is explicitly stated that wages are negotiable, then the gender difference disappears. This

442

gives some insight into how negotiation relates to the gender wage gap in businesses.

443

In a provocative set of studies, Lee and colleagues (2016) sought to better understand the underlying reasons for

444

some of the gender differences in negotiation. Using an evolutionary psychology approach, the authors predicted that

445

because of greater male intra-sexual competition for mates, unethical behavior would be greater in negotiations between

446

men than between women. A positive relationship between unethical behavior and mating motivation was found for

447

men, but not women. Gender differences in unethical behavior, were greater with males and showed more unethical

448

behavior when negotiating between same-sex, attractive opponents.

449

3.2.2.

Contextual characteristics

450

Power. In negotiation, power is primarily determined by one’s ability to induce the other party to settle for an

451

outcome less than her maximum utility (Greenhalgh et al., 1985) and the strength of one’s best alternative to a negotiated

452

agreement relative to one’s opponent (Pinkley et al., 1994). Best alternatives have been found to have several effects on

453

negotiators. For example, negotiators with better alternatives set higher goals (Pinkley, 1995), behave more agentically

454

(Galinsky et al., 2003), and are more likely to use threats (Lawler, 1992).

455

Power associated with social status, the esteem and respect conferred by others, has its own set of effects on

456

negotiation. For example, high status parties may treat others in more procedurally just ways, such as listening to their

457

counterparts’ concerns and opinions, but only when the high-status parties also have a weaker alternative (Blader &

458

Chen, 2012). Wolfe and McGinn (2005) demonstrated that objective power and perceived relative power have different

459

effects on negotiation outcomes. They found that objective power drives individual payoffs, while perceived relative

460

power exerts a strong effect on joint outcomes. Specifically, as perceived equality increases the potential for integration

461

in the negotiation increases.
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Insights into negotiation strategies are offered by Schweinsberg and colleagues (2012). Their research showed that

463

extreme first offers may offend recipients and lead to an impasse but if the impasse is avoided it can bring benefits.

464

Therefore, extreme offers can be risky. Furthermore, it was found that although both low- and high-power negotiators

465

are offended by extreme offers, it is the low power negotiators who walk away.

466

Teams and multi-party negotiations. Multi-party negotiation is characterized by a higher level of complexity and

467

longer time to settle as compared to dyadic negotiations. Research has found that teams achieved higher outcomes and

468

perceived themselves to be more powerful as compared to individual opponents (Polzer, 1996). Teams exchange more

469

information and generate higher-quality ideas for solutions as compared to individual negotiators. Hinds and Mortensen

470

(2005) examined conflict and its effects on distributed teams to determine how existing models of conflict for co-located

471

teams apply to distributed teams. They found that distributed teams experienced more task conflict and interpersonal

472

conflict than collocated teams. Also, spontaneous communication had a direct effect on mitigating the effect of

473

distribution in conflict. This shows that spontaneous communication is a useful tool in handling conflict for distributed

474

teams. Swaab et al. (2012) proposed that the impact of communication channels depends on whether the communicator

475

is cooperative or not. A meta-analysis supported the validity of this model for understanding the effect of

476

communication channels on negotiation and group decision-making. Communication channels (i.e. visual channels,

477

vocal channels, synchronicity) increased high-quality negotiation only when the communicator orientation was neutral.

478

When cooperation was dominant, communication channels neither hurt nor hindered negotiation quality. When

479

noncooperation was dominant, communication channels hindered outcome quality.

480

Time. Time plays a role in negotiation processes and outcomes in several ways. First, outcome delays – occurring

481

when parties negotiate about future outcomes – moderate preferences and expectations. Research shows that outcome

482

delays increase the efficiency reaching agreements due to perceptions of less contentious and aggressive opponents

483

(Okhuysen et al., 2003). Time pressures have also been found to affect negotiators’ perceptions and abilities to reach

484

efficient outcomes. Agreements tend to favor the negotiator with less time pressure (Moore, 2004a) but informing the

485

other party about a deadline can lead them to make concessions faster (Moore, 2004b). In addition, De Dreu (2003)

486

found that time pressure reduces negotiators’ motivation to process information systematically, produces a greater

487

reliance on cognitive heuristics, and leads to less integrative agreements.
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488

3.3. Trends using social dilemma models

489

In the most recent review and analysis of social dilemmas in the organizational literature, Van Lange et al. (2013)

490

conclude that the study of social dilemmas is “alive and kicking.” The review looks at different types of social dilemmas,

491

recent developments in the field, and makes suggestions for future studies. Topics include theoretical frameworks

492

(interdependence, appropriateness, evolutionary), developments in structural, psychological and dynamic influences,

493

and prospects for future social dilemmas. They suggest that moving forward scholars could explore further the role of

494

emotions, construal processes, facial information, intergroup issues, reputation, and gossip.

495

Structural influences. De Cremer et al. (2012) discuss the integration between procedural justice, sanctioning

496

systems, and public good dilemmas. Because there is little or no incentive for voluntary provisions in public goods

497

dilemmas, it is in everyone’s benefit to take advantage of them without contributing to their production. They found

498

that the procedural justice of the sanction had greater influence when the group failed early in the game and the group

499

members exhibited high group identification. If the group members did not identify with the group, the procedural

500

justice of the sanction only influenced contributions if the group had succeeded earlier in the game. Therefore,

501

procedural justice matters in the sanctioning system’s effectiveness.

502

Kugler and Bornstein (2013) investigate the role of conflict structure in social dilemmas. Bilateral conflicts between

503

groups and an individual, such as a confrontation between an employer and group of workers, involve asymmetric and

504

complex interactions. In computer-controlled experiments, individuals and non-cooperative groups interacted in social

505

dilemmas games. This asymmetric competition was compared to symmetric control conditions in which both

506

competitors were either individuals or groups. Results showed that individuals generally did better than non-cooperative

507

groups, regardless of conflict type. In symmetric conditions, individuals showed more cooperation with other individuals

508

as compared to cooperation between groups. In asymmetric conditions, individuals took advantage of the group’s

509

difficulties and dominated.

510

Psychological influences. Balliet and Ferris (2013) conducted research to better understand the relationship

511

between ostracism and prosocial behavior. They hypothesized that whether individuals reduce prosocial behavior

512

following ostracism depends on how they managed the temptation to treat others poorly in the short-term versus the

513

long-term benefits of not treating others poorly. The studies showed that individuals who are less future-oriented
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514

engaged in less prosocial behavior with others who have ostracized them than those who are more future-oriented.

515

Yamagishi et al. (2013) also investigated pro-social behavior in a study in which participants completed five games (two

516

prisoner’s dilemmas, a trust game, a dictator game, and a faith game) with several month intervals in between games.

517

The first major finding of this study was that participants showed across-game behavioral consistency. There was a

518

strong correlation between the trusting choice in the faith games and acting in a pro-social manner in the other games.

519

It was also found that there were significant cross-game correlations between expectations of the partner’s behavior and

520

a player’s own behavior. This showed that a player’s generalized expectations of human pro-sociality affected their own

521

pro-social behavior.

522

Social value orientation has also been found to be related to cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas. Fiedler et al.

523

(2013) considered the underlying processes of this relationship. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of

524

inspected information, the degree of attention toward the others’ payoffs and the number of transitions from and toward

525

others’ payoffs increased with social value orientation deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Information search

526

seems to underlie the relationship between social value orientation and cooperation.

527

Intergenerational dilemmas. Some of the most important issues in organizations and society today have long

528

time horizons and thus conflict can involve more than one generation of people. Intergenerational decisions regarding

529

the allocation and consumption of resources may create a conflict of interest between the present and future generations

530

as the present generation may be required to forego the consumption of desirable resources to maintain sustainable

531

levels for the future. Economists have examined how to balance the interests of present and future generations such

532

that efficiency is optimized (e.g., Kotlikoff, 1995; Portney & Weyant, 1999). In contrast to this normative approach, a

533

burgeoning body of scholarship in teams of management scholars and social psychologists focus on identifying the

534

psychological factors that affect intergenerational decisions (see Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009, for a review). Most of

535

this work centers on “intergenerational dilemmas,” defined as decisions in which the interests of present decision makers

536

conflict with the interests of future others.

537

An imperative in the study of intergenerational dilemmas has been to identify factors that influence the extent to

538

which members of the present generation (void of economic or material incentive) are willing to sacrifice their own self-

539

interest for the benefit of future others. Central variables that affect decisions about intergenerational conflict include
21

540

temporal and interpersonal distance between decisions and outcomes (Wade-Benzoni, 2003; 2008), uncertainty about

541

the future (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008; see also McCarter et al., 2010), lack of direct reciprocity between generations

542

(Bang et al., 2017; Wade-Benzoni, 2002), egocentrism (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008), asymmetric power (Tost et al., 2015),

543

resource valence (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2010), and legacy motivations (Fox et al., 2010; Wade-Benzoni, 2006; Wade-

544

Benzoni et al., 2012).

545

3.4. Trends using the social exchange model

546

Subsequent empirical work on resource dependence models, building on social exchange theory, sought to

547

understand bridging mechanisms (Thompson, 1967) which allow organizations to manage their constraints with other

548

organizations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 114) maintain that organizations use bridging mechanisms to “accomplish

549

a restructuring of the organization’s interdependencies, rather than for reasons of profitability or efficiency.” The

550

earliest empirical work citing resource dependency identifying bridging mechanisms was carried out by Pfeffer and his

551

colleagues (Pfeffer, 1972a, 1972b, 1973; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980).

552

Principle interest centered on actions firms take to minimize dependencies which lessen external constraints namely:

553

mergers and acquisitions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), joint venture/alliances (e.g. Mitchell & Singh, 1992), alliance

554

portfolios (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), political action (Mullery et al., 1995), executive succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1983),

555

trade associations (Granovetter, 1994) and boards of directors (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Specifically, Scott and Davis

556

(2003) noted that much empirical research surrounding resource dependence theory investigates the relationship

557

between the firm and its board of directors. Firms may appoint board members to help facilitate access to resources

558

(e.g. Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). For example, in countries where nationalization of firms is a risk, many companies tend

559

to seek board representatives from government to increase their likelihood of favorable policies towards the firm (e.g.

560

Liang et al., 2015). Three recent themes we note emerging over the past five years address the relationship between

561

power and dependence, relational outcomes given power imbalances, and learning from terminating bridging

562

mechanisms such as alliances. We review each of these recent themes below.

563

Power versus dependence. A firm seeking to use size as leverage may wish to pursue mergers and acquisitions to

564

gain power. Empire building, through increased of merger and acquisition activity, may exist because a firm wants to

565

increase its size as leverage over key stakeholders, such as suppliers or politicians (Darnall et al., 2010; Hope & Thomas,
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566

2008). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) found that acquisition activity followed a pattern of power and dependence. Rather

567

than theorizing dependence as solely the inverse of power, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) posited that industries are

568

both composed of power relations as well as conditions of mutual dependence. Mutual dependence reflects the shared

569

level of constraints between two parties. Their study considered both types of relational constraints finding separate

570

effects of power and mutual dependence in merger and acquisition activity. This conceptualization that power and

571

dependence as distinct constructs led to understanding a variety of organizational outcomes including alliances (Lee et

572

al., 2015) and divestitures (Xia & Li, 2013).

573

Trust development under power asymmetry. Conflict may exacerbate from failed expectations from previous

574

trust violations (Lumineau et al., 2015). Trust exists between firms as a positive expectation that the counterpart will act

575

in good faith (Rousseau et al., 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998). As firms continue to work through their conflict, they are likely

576

to establish a reputation of trustworthiness within their industry (Park & Ungson, 2001). Consequently, a firm’s

577

enhanced reputation may make it easier for the firm to form new alliances. However, trust development and beliefs are

578

not always symmetric across both parties in power imbalanced relationships where firms make asymmetric investments.

579

One partner may believe they are in a trusting relationship while the other may not, particularly in single shot games

580

(e.g. Graebner, 2009). Firms may also compensate for asymmetries between organizational groups by using structural

581

mechanisms such as contracts. Lumineau and Malhotra (2011) found that contracts influence the type of conflict

582

resolution approaches adopted by disputing firms particularly where power is asymmetric. Further, McEvily et al. (2017)

583

found that power imbalances impact the antecedents to trust for each party in different ways, so that less powerful

584

parties would look towards the more powerful party to determine their own perceptions about the more powerful party

585

in relationship, largely ignoring their own circumstance.

586

Alliance termination. Firms may seek alternate forms of relationships among organizational groups such as

587

strategic alliances that can more fluidly adapt to the external environment than acquisitions. The pattern of failures for

588

acquisitions is well-understood by the market, as purchasing firm’s stock prices tend to lower on acquisition

589

announcements (Morck et al., 1990). However, alliance termination rates also remain similarly high at 50-70%, with

590

these estimates potentially under-reporting terminations as firms are not required to disclose non-equity alliance

591

activities. Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) found a relationship between changes in the external environment and alliance
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592

termination. Given the preponderance of alliance termination rates, Faems et al. (2008) extended prior work on alliance

593

terminations to consider how alliance partners may use a failing relationship to successfully execute another alliance in

594

tandem. Their case study of subsequent ink-jet printer R&D alliances between the same partners suggests that

595

restructuring a prior alliance may be an alternate recourse for a firms’ adjusting to their external environment. Moreover,

596

Mellewigt et al., (2017) reveal that – after an alliance has been terminated – the recurrence of the same partnership as

597

another alliance or acquisition is impacted by the characteristics of the prior alliance. The characteristics which influence

598

the likelihood of a subsequent alliance are partner-specific: trust, routines, and the focal firm’s understanding of the

599

target firm’s assets. Thus, knowledge gained about a former partner in a prior transaction may be beneficial in

600

subsequent relationships with the same partner.

601

3.5. Trends using the transaction cost economics model

602

Streams of work in the management literature have largely focused on make-buy decisions, but also the role of

603

hierarchy such as M-form and U-form organizations, employment relationships assessing short-term temporary work

604

versus long-term full-time employment as well as complex contracts where relational and formal contracts play

605

complementary governance support (Scott & Davis, 2003; see Macher & Richman, 2008 for a review of empirical work).

606

Organizational scholars were particularly interested in hybrid forms of governance (Williamson 1983, 1991) such that

607

an entire continuum of governance choices between make versus buy ranging from licensing to equity arrangements

608

such as joint ventures (Oxley, 1999; Park & Russo, 1996) could be approached as outcomes of transaction cost

609

considerations. Within the management literature the empirical work investigating transaction cost economics has

610

mainly focused on comparing and integrating other organizational theories by relaxing initial assumptions and

611

integrating relationship, firm, and transaction level considerations (Hoetker, 2005; Ghosh & John, 1999, 2005; Argyres,

612

1996). Building on the resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), prior work suggests that a

613

firm’s distinctive competencies increases the efficiency of the governance choice (Silverman, 1999), thus implying similar

614

transactions for different firms may employ alternate governance structures (Nickerson et al., 2001). More broadly,

615

organizational scholars have also drawn from organizational theories invoking the external environment (Osborn &

616

Baughn, 1990) and institutional theory (Hughes et al., 1997, Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Zhao et al., 2004).
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617

Opportunism and trust. The role of opportunism played a role in transaction cost economics since its

618

conceptualization. Many transaction hazards are exacerbated by an absence of trust due to the threat of opportunism.

619

Specifically, Williamson (1993) argues in favor of calculative trust where actors are better served by guarding themselves

620

against opportunism. This contrasts with other scholars’ view of trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to the other party

621

(Zaheer et al., 1998), by entering an exchange with positive expectations (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007). Contracts

622

moderate the trust-conflict relationship (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) by clarifying partners’ expectations and detail

623

conflict resolution mechanisms. Where trust may be relatively weak initially, contracts may facilitate partners’ beliefs

624

about trust in the other by enhancing transparency. Likewise, stronger forms of trust may lessen the need for costlier

625

forms of alliance relationships such as equity based arrangements that create mutual hostages which safeguard against

626

conflict (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Recently, Lumineau and colleagues (Guo et al., 2017; Lumineau, 2017) argue that

627

trust and distrust can co-exist simultaneously.

628

Unpacking uncertainty. The recent work of Weber and her co-authors develop transaction cost theorizing by

629

focusing on the psychological elements of the exchange relationship surrounding uncertainty. Weber and Mayer (2014)

630

introduced cognitive frames by theorizing about conflict due to uncertainty. They define uncertainty as any

631

“unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier et al., 1990, p. 82). Traditionally,

632

scholars have focused on how uncertainty in the external environment increases transaction costs due to opportunism

633

(Williamson, 1975) and information overload (Simon, 1957). Weber and Mayer (2014) expanded the theory that

634

transaction costs and conflict arise from differing interpretations of the environment due to each party’s unique

635

cognitive frames. In other words, they posit that if the parties involved have conflicting cognitive frames their

636

interpretation of the unanticipated event will differ leading to divergent opinions of how to respond to the event leading

637

to conflict. Moreover, they argue that efficient governing mechanisms are those that facilitate congruent cognitive

638

frames. Foss and Weber (2016) draw from the bounded rationality literature addressed a common critique of transaction

639

cost economics: it fails to explain when hierarchies collapse or differ in efficiency.

640

Negotiation roles. The role of each party in a relationship may also influence the bargaining process as well as the

641

design of efficient governance structures. As mentioned above, as firms continue to work with each other their

642

subsequent boundary spanning representatives will establish familiar routines, trust each other and consequently
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643

decrease transaction costs (e.g. Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, recently scholars indicate that the parties involved

644

in the contracting relationship may influence the efficiency of the outcome (e.g. Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Bercovitz &

645

Tyler, 2014). For example, Bercovitz and Tyler (2014) examined the contracting relationship between scientists and for-

646

profit institutions and found that firm representatives were more likely to increase the specificity of the contract over

647

time, whereas the scientists were more likely to decrease it. Others have looked at the influence of power gained by

648

buyer versus supplier firm roles (e.g. McEvily et al., 2017; Nyaga et al., 2013) suggesting there may also be differences

649

in sources of governance derived from the positions the parties occupy across the value chain.

650

4. Future Directions for Conflict Research in Management

651

Harnessing conflict’s advantages and navigating its burdens continues to be the focal interest of management

652

scholars. In the current section, we summarize what we believe to be the important future research directions for each

653

area of management research utilizing the six reviewed models of conflict.

654

4.1. The future of diversity-conflict models

655

There is no dearth of research on diversity-conflict models reporting the statistically significance of the relationships

656

among diversity, conflict types, and team performance (see De Dreu & Weingart, 2003, for a meta-analysis). However,

657

one avenue with little traffic is to determine the model’s practical significance. Most scholars on the diversity-conflict

658

model ask Is there an effect between a diversity and team performance as mediated by conflict? The next question is to ask How much

659

of an effect is there? In knowing the size of the science behind the diversity-conflict model will give us the model’s

660

“organizational significance” (Shaver, 2008). Surprisingly, our review of the diversity-conflict finds little examination of

661

magnitude - at least when it comes to quantifiable outcomes. The neglect of putting size to the science is a lack of

662

confidence in the model’s practical power (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996). It is one thing for the diversity-conflict theorist

663

to say to an executive “you can capitalize on the differences in teams through behavioral leadership training that reduces

664

team conflict,” and it is another more meaningful thing to say, “Typically managers who are trained in how to be

665

consistent in how they respectfully instruct and encourage their teams will see 20% fewer sick days and an 15% increase

666

in sales from employees.” While there are multiple ways to assess a theory’s practical size, McCloskey and Ziliak’s

667

(1996) assessment approach may be a good starting point.
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668

Another field ripe for picking involves finding strategies that encourage wanted conflict while not simultaneously

669

encouraging unwanted conflict. For instance, encouraging a devil’s advocacy strategy in a team increases task conflict

670

but it can also simultaneously increase relational conflict (Cosier & Rose, 1977). Carton and Tewfik’s (2016) recent

671

review of conflict strategies proposes that strategies used in isolation may do more harm than good. Rather,

672

combinations of strategies are submitted by Carton and Tewfik (2016) to be more effective in successfully navigating

673

diversity-stemmed conflict. Future scholarship may produce findings of high theoretical and practical significance by

674

testing the arguments made in the Carton and Tewfink (2016) paper. A second layer of the conflict-strategy puzzle

675

germane to the Carton and Tewfink (2016) taxonomy and theory is knowing who is best to implement the solutions. A

676

promising theory to help solve this puzzle is decision process theory. Decision process theory would maintain that who

677

implements a solution is just as important as which solutions are employed (e.g. Vroom & Yetton, 1973). For instance,

678

teams high in status conflict may not react well to a fellow teammate using intervention and prefer an outsider to institute

679

chance solutions.

680

4.2. The future of behavioral negotiation model

681

Two areas have seen increasing development pertaining to the behavioral negotiation model. The first is sacred

682

issues or ideologically or value-based issues play out differently than negotiations dealing with more traditional material

683

interests (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002b). When an issue involves a

684

closely held value, people are less likely to be willing to make tradeoffs on that issue in exchange for something else.

685

Naturally, this can interfere with the essential “logrolling” aspect of integrative negotiations. Research has revealed that

686

opposing sides in ideological conflicts tend to exaggerate their opponents’ extremism (Keltner & Robinson, 1993;

687

Robinson et al., 1995; Robinson & Kray, 2001). Sacred issues in negotiations tend to increase the likelihood of impasse,

688

reduce the profitability of outcomes, and produce more negative perceptions of opponents - particularly when

689

negotiators have a strong best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009). More recently, Bendersky

690

(2014) proposed a way to solve ideological conflict: affirming an opponent’s status may help reduce defensiveness and

691

resistance to compromising in ideological conflicts. In a study by Tuller et al. (2015), participants were asked to write

692

about a controversial issue from the perspective of a partner with an opposing view. The approach was effective at

693

changing views but only when participants met with the opponent in person and observed the perspective-taking effort.
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694

The study of individual differences and personality initially fell out of favor among negotiation scholars due to early

695

research by Rubin and Brown (1975) concluding that it had little impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes. For

696

many years, negotiation scholars have been enamored with studying the power of the situation to influence negotiations

697

(Brett & Thompson, 2016). However, a relatively recent meta-analysis concluded that a variety of individual differences

698

affect the strategies negotiators use, individual and joint gains, and psychological outcomes (Sharma et al., 2013). The

699

effect of personality was further investigated by Dimotakis et al. (2012) who found that negotiators high in agreeableness

700

were best suited for integrative negotiations while negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited for distributive

701

negotiations. Negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit for their context had higher levels of cardiac arousal than

702

those who were not a good fit, which related to positive affect, persistence, and increased economic outcomes.

703

4.3. The future of social dilemma models

704

A significant body of research on cooperation has opened questions of how such knowledge can be applied to

705

social dilemmas in real-world conflicts. An important challenge regarding practical implications is that much of the

706

current debate on the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas assumes a static, one-time relationship. Unlike

707

experimental settings, social interactions in real life involve repeated interactions in which decision makers actively

708

respond to changes in its dynamic and adopt different strategies (Van Lange et al., 2013). For example, business ventures

709

often involve repeated partnership and dealings. Sometimes the end of the business relationship is expected, such as

710

when contract duration is specified, but can be ambiguous in other relationships. An awareness of possible future

711

encounters and long-term relationships can have significant impact on individual choices in social dilemmas. If repeated

712

encounters are expected, acting selfishly and pushing the other too hard can invite retaliation in the future (Axelrod,

713

1984). Conversely, if the interaction is likely to end soon, individuals may discount the future payoffs and the interest

714

of others and decide not to cooperate in the present.

715

The prospective of future interactions also involves possible encounters with others in the same network.

716

Reputation matters in the interconnected society and discourages individuals from engaging in socially undesirable

717

behavior. Knowing that today’s selfish or cooperative action may trigger a negative or positive feedback loop in future

718

conflicts can encourage individuals to contemplate their long-term reputations (McCarter et al., 2011b). A non-

719

cooperative reputation can eventually lead to ostracism (Kerr et al., 2009). On a more psychological level, people are in
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720

fact aware of this effect of transparency and more likely to cooperate with subtle signals of being watched by others

721

(Bateson et al., 2006). Understanding such a reputational mechanism will also be informative in social dilemmas in larger

722

settings, in which uncertainty and anonymity are the major obstacles to cooperation. For example, Weber and

723

Murnighan (2008) find that a consistent contributor in social dilemmas creates cooperative perceptions of social norms,

724

which facilitates fellow members’ cooperation. In this case, while the emergence of contributors may underlie the role

725

of individual difference factors, efforts to increase structural transparency and reputational effects are crucial to support

726

and facilitate their positive influences on other members. Therefore, the lessons derived from understanding one’s

727

perspective on relationships through time or across partners will be worthy of future investigation, providing

728

prescriptive advice regarding paths to cooperation.

729

4.4. The future of social exchange models

730

Scholars may focus on how the consequences of conflict may be impacted by power asymmetry. Conflict itself is

731

not necessarily positive or negative for any organizational relationship, despite its pervasiveness. Prior emphasis on

732

symmetry in mutual understanding across partners (e.g. Lewis & Wiegert, 1985) for mitigating conflict may not account

733

for the diverse perceptions each party brings to their relationship (e.g. Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). As Pondy (1967)

734

explained, that the function of conflict can be either beneficial or detrimental for the relationship and parties involved.

735

We note that the firm level potential benefits gained through conflict are likely similar in imbalanced and balanced power

736

relationships (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Park & Ungson, 2001). The difference lies in the likelihood for resolution

737

between the two parties, affecting outcomes at the level of the dyad. Power advantaged firms might be privileged in

738

guiding conflict resolution and, propose for future research, that firms in asymmetric relationships may be more likely

739

to find a resolution than those in symmetric power relationships. Power asymmetry may play more of a positive role in

740

mitigating conflict than prior work has assumed.

741

4.5. The future of transaction cost economics models

742

As management scholars look to the future there is a trend towards taking a micro-foundational approach to the

743

transaction cost literature. Such recent theorizing may lend well to empirical testing in laboratory environments. Future

744

conflict researchers might heed Lumineau et al.’s (2015) recommendation that transaction cost perspectives can explore

745

different types of conflict among organizational groups, such as integrity-based and competence-based failures.
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746

However, with many of these conflict types, the offending firm may have a divergent perception of what validates their

747

past behavior, misinterpreting the potential of an integrity-violation as an act of strategic necessity (e.g. Sutcliffe &

748

Zaheer, 1998). For example, in pursuit of greater efficiency, the offending firm may utilize more resources than the

749

other party perceives as appropriate and unintentionally cause conflict within the relationship. To that end, we add that

750

the long-term impact on value creation versus the share of value captured by the partners (e.g. Elfenbein & Zenger,

751

2017), may be a promising avenue to pursue to understand each party’s costs and motivations in maintaining governance

752

structures despite the presence of conflict.

753

5. An Integration of Intragroup Conflict Models

754

There are patterns and differences across the five models reviewed. Indeed, each model complements the others in

755

a host of ways, and this complementarity is summarized in Table 2.

756

5.1. Insights about intragroup conflict

757

A common thread across the five models is that conflict within a group can create considerable barriers to

758

organizational effectiveness. Diversity-conflict models predict that teams with high relational, process, and status

759

conflict will not perform well. Social dilemma models predict that – without restructuring the payoffs, instigating

760

cooperative contextual cues, and removing competitive individuals – costly conflict will increase. Behavioral negotiation

761

models maintain that when negotiators take primarily a distributive approach to dividing resources that conflict will be

762

high and the likelihood of achieving an agreement is low. When it comes to conflict among alliances networks (Gomes-

763

Casseres, 1994), social exchange models suggest that control over resources motivates organizations to reduce

764

dependence on each other. Intragroup conflict might arise out of this struggle for control. The transaction cost

765

economics model proposes that conflict will increase the use of safeguards, thereby increasing use of costlier forms of

766

organizing in alliance relations.

767

A key difference rests in what these models say about positive outcomes from conflict. Diversity-conflict and

768

behavioral negotiation models both predict that the work team or negotiating parties will be better off when conflict

769

exists under certain conditions; e.g. moderate levels of task conflict and competing preferences where there are different

770

values. Social dilemma and transaction cost models see intragroup conflict as primarily a negative event that can only
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771

be mitigated through structural or motivation solutions.7 Social exchange models suggest that firms can establish more

772

independence by using conflict to lessen their dependence on resources from other firms.

773

Overall, three models (i.e. diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models) view intragroup

774

conflict as a contingency process where two of the models (i.e. social dilemma and transaction cost models) view

775

intragroup conflict as resulting in a negative outcome. Of the five models, only the diversity-conflict model parses

776

conflict into a multidimensional construct (i.e. task conflict, relational conflict, process conflict, and status conflict)

777

where the remaining models see conflict as one-dimensional – leading to either a positive or negative outcome.8

778

5.2. How conflict is conceptualized

779

The volume of conflict research in management studies brings with it different views about intragroup conflict.

780

Consequently, the models reviewed here define intragroup conflict differently. Transaction cost economics define

781

intragroup conflict as “a destructive process, creating negative reactions” (White et al., 2007). Social dilemma models

782

view conflict as a tension between individual and group interests, where an individual cannot do something to benefit

783

themselves without harming the group (Kollock, 1998). Taken together, transaction cost economics and social dilemma

784

models view intragroup conflict as always resulting in a negative outcome that should be either navigated or discouraged.

785

On the other hand, diversity-conflict, behavioral negotiation, and social exchange models view intragroup conflict

786

as something that can be leveraged. The diversity-conflict model sees conflict as a multi-dimensional construct, with

787

such dimensions as task conflict being something to encourage and relational conflict being something to avoid (Jehn

788

et al., 1999). Behavioral negotiation models also view conflict as being a good thing or a bad thing depending on what

789

issues the negotiators value, how much those issues are valued, and what information is shared among negotiating

790

parties. The information exchange process helps both sides better understand each other’s interests and thus make

791

possible tradeoffs among integrative issues, thereby meeting all parties’ interests (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010).

792

Social exchange models suggest that, as firms continue to work together and resolve conflicts, they will begin to establish

793

strong relational norms, trust, and commitment (Lumineau et al., 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Consequently,

794

they will rely less on formal and costly governance mechanisms (e.g. contracts) to settle conflict as time passes (Gulati

795

& Nickerson, 2008). The differences in the models’ definitions of conflict leave us with our broad definition of

796

intragroup conflict that we began with in the current review.
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797

5.3. Analytical unit of analysis and methodology

798

There are differences among the five models when it comes to the unit of analysis and methodology. Diversity-

799

conflict and behavioral negotiation models are studied primarily at the individual, human subject level as part of a work

800

team or community. Transaction cost economics and social exchange models examine intragroup conflict primarily at

801

the interorganizational level as part of an alliance venture (portfolio, consortia, or network or partners) with the caveat

802

that transaction cost examines transactions and firms may be involved in multiple transactions simultaneously. Social

803

dilemma models – while originally used at the individual human-subject level – are now regularly used to understand

804

intragroup conflict among organizations.

805

Behavioral negotiation and social dilemma models are almost exclusively studied in the behavioral laboratory, where

806

there is tight control over testing the model relationships. It is only recently that management scholars have used field

807

studies (i.e. natural experiments) to examine the general application of social dilemma models (e.g. Van den Assem et

808

al., 2012). Diversity-conflict models have been tested in the behavioral laboratory as well, but have also examined the

809

direct application of the models through longitudinal field studies where team structure, conflict types, and performance

810

are measured at different points in time (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Jehn et al., 1997; Jehn et al., 1999).

811

Social exchange and transaction cost models both have been approached using mixed-methods. More recently

812

scholars have turned their attention towards testing social exchange theory in the behavioral laboratory (e.g. Galinsky,

813

Rucker & Magee, 2015) but less so at an interorganizational level as much interorganizational research has been tested

814

through survey and archival data. Thus, scholars have examined the direct application of social exchange models while

815

also recently wanting higher control when testing the models’ relationships. In contrast, more recent laboratory-based

816

studies of transaction cost economics complement years of field studies that examine the applicability of the models

817

(e.g. Harmon, Kim & Mayer, 2015; for reviews see McDowell & Voelker, 2008; Macher & Richmann, 2008).

818

6. Concluding Remark

819

The study of intragroup conflict in management is old, at least old in relation to the tenure of the management field.

820

The fact that management lies at the confluence of multiple fields in the social sciences, has resulted in a voluminous

821

body of conflict research, making it difficult for a single article to present the curious student a comprehensive review.

822

The current research summarizes five models used to study intragroup conflict in management. Each model has been
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823

the muse for scholars to understand how existing conflict can be leveraged (even increased) to an individual’s advantage;

824

how conflict can be reduced to an individual’s advantage; and the contingencies of when conflict is a blessing and a

825

curse for a person or organization. Figure 2 is a Venn diagram conceptualizing the conflict research domain in

826

management and provides a sample of empirical and theory papers across the five models.

827

While each model has been well-used and improved upon, many unanswered, important questions about conflict

828

in and among organizations remains. Management scholars who want to make a significant impact in the study of

829

conflict may consider problematizing the models or challenging core assumptions of a model while bringing alternative

830

logics and models from the literature’s periphery into consideration (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). In doing so,

831

management will increase its collective wisdom about conflict. In other words, in knowing what it does not know or

832

what it assumes it knows about conflict, management scholars will be better equipped to make order out of the chaos

833

of conflict.
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While the management field has many top-tier scholarly outlets for research, our review primarily covers articles
published in top-tier North American management journals. Our reasoning patterns after Pratt’s (2008) in his review of best
practices in qualitative management research: publishing in the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science, and Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes would advance an
academic toward tenure and promotion in any business school in the world. Journals like Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal
of Personality & Social Psychology, Management Science, Journal of Operations Management, and Strategic Management Journal, while also
prestigious in management, are kept to a minimum in the review because they also represent flagship journals in fields of
psychology, social psychology, management science, operations research, and strategy.
1

2 Occasionally, some scholars draw a line between intergroup and intragroup conflict, with intragroup conflict only
occurring within organizations and intergroup conflict only occurring among organizations (e.g. Smith et al., 1995). Indeed,
across the expanse of management studies, some literatures conceptualize a group in this way, focusing on a collective of
people within an organization; e.g. the group process (e.g. Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971) and strategic group decision
making literatures (e.g. Cool & Schendel, 1987). However, the current paper follows the broader conceptualization of
groups suggested by the writings of Sullivan (2002) and Staw (1991): a group is any collective of agents – be they humans,
departments, firms, communities, or generations – who are interdependently connected.

Indeed, each of the models we review have their own reviews. The curious student may consider the following sample
reviews that primarily describe each literatures’ findings: the diversity-conflict model (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 2005), social
dilemma models (e.g. Van Lange et al., 2013), the behavioral-negotiation model (e.g. Thompson et al., 2010), the social
exchange model (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), and the transaction cost economics model (e.g. Silverman, 2002).
3

Early management papers researching conflict likened conflict to war through various terms and descriptors; e.g. battles,
attack, hurt, and harm (e.g. Thompson, 1961). These terms, for the most part, declined in use during the 1970s, were near
extinct by the 1990s, and now appear but occasionally in management research in such developing areas as territoriality in
organizations (e.g. Brown et al., 2005) and hypercompetition (e.g. D’aveni & Gunther, 2010). Therefore, we do not address
war research in the current review of the management literature.
4

Recent scholarship merged the ideas of give-some and take-some dilemmas into a hybrid social dilemma termed the
give-or-take-some dilemma (McCarter et al., 2011a; Budescu & McCarter, 2012). Its considerable newness and dearth of
research, while providing much room for exploration, makes the give-or-take-some dilemma not a focus of the current review.
For further discussion about the give-or-take-some dilemma, the reader may benefit from Van Lange et al.’s (2013) review of
the psychology of social dilemmas.
5

6 The reader may find of interest work utilizing the social exchange model to understand intragroup in the context of
organizational justice, workplace politics, incivility, and abusive supervision (e.g. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Zellars,
Tepper, & Duffy, 2002).

The reader may find of interest Gary Bornstein’s work on increasing cooperation within groups by increasing conflict
between them (e.g. Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al., 1990). These experiments are not reviewed in the
current paper because they examine conflict between groups and not within them.
7

8 Social dilemma models distinguish between opportunistic and defensive conflict or defection (e.g. McCarter et al.,
2010; McCarter et al., 2011b; Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). However, the multidimensionality of conflict here is between
why a person chooses a course of action that harms the collective and not a course that can benefit the collective through
conflict.
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Table 1: Research on Intragroup Conflict in Management

Topic

Description

1) The definition of conflict is …

a dynamic process whereby at least one agent feels, perceives, or behaves in opposition toward
another agent.

2) Main models of intragroup conflict include …

• diversity-conflict model
• behavioral negotiation model
• social dilemma models
• social exchange model, and
• transaction cost model

3) Foundational publications for each model include …

• general conflict research: Thompson (1960); Cyert & March (1963); Litterer (1966);
and Pondy (1967)
• diversity-conflict model: Jehn (1995, 1997); and Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale (1999)
• behavioral negotiation model: Walton & McKersie (1965); Pruitt & Rubin (1986); and Neale
& Northcraft (1991)
• social dilemma model: Dawes (1980); Messick & Brewer (1983); Kollock (1998); and Weber,
Kopelman, & Messick (2004)
• social exchange model: Emerson (1962); Blau (1964); and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
• transaction cost economics model: Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975)
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Table 2: A Comparison among Five Models of Intragroup Conflict in Management Studies
Diversity-Conflict
Models
Promote certain kinds
of conflict (e.g. task
conflict) while
discouraging others;
e.g. relational and
status conflict through
group characteristics.

Social Dilemma
Models
Decrease conflict through
structural and motivational
solutions that encourage
strategies that benefit the
collective as well as the
individual.

Behavioral Negotiation
Models
Leverage conflict through
integrative negotiation
where the parties value the
issues differently, creating
more value to divide
through distributive
negotiation.

Social Exchange
Models
Desire for independence
motivates conflict where
parties are interdependent
for their access to shared
resources.

Transaction Cost
Models
Efficient contract design
mitigates conflict and
facilitates order. Risk of
opportunism, motivates
actors to seek appropriate
safeguards against conflict.

Conflict primarily viewed
as resulting in a …

Mix of positive and
negative outcomes

Negative outcome

Mix of positive and negative
outcomes

Mix of positive and negative
outcomes

Negative outcome

Analytic units are …

Individual and group
level

Individual and group level

Individual and dyad

Dyad and Network

Transaction

Methodologies include …

Individual and teamlevel field surveys, and
laboratory experiments

Individual and team-level
laboratory experiments

Individual and dyad-level
laboratory experiments

Case studies and large
sample field studies

Large sample field studies
and laboratory experiments

Disciplinary foundation
based in …

Organizational
behavior

Social psychology

Organizational behavior /
Social psychology

Social psychology /
Sociology / Organizational
theory

Economics

Comparison Categories
Key ideas include …
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Figure 1: Conflict-Related Papers in Top North-American Management Journals, 1990-2015

Note: The figure was generated based on five journals Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly,
Organizational Science, and Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes. The search terms – e.g. conflict, cooperation, social dilemma, negotiation, and
alliance – commonly associated with models of conflict in management. Web of Science searches for articles within the given journals with these terms
in the title were performed on 29 September 2016.
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1
2
3

Figure 2: A Venn diagram of intragroup conflict research in management with a focus on five models and a
sample of prior research.

Reducing
conflict

Leveraging
conflict

Dawes (1980) SD
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) SE
Williamson (1975) TCE
Greer et al. (2011) DC
Weber & Mayer (2014) TCE
Kray & Thompson (2005) BN

4
5
6
7

Jehn et al. (1999) DC

Jehn (1995) DC

Weber et al. (2004) SD

Amanatullah & Tinsley (2013) BN

Neale & Northcraft (1991) BN

McEvily et al. (2017) SE

Lumineau et al. (2015) TCE

Faems et al. (2008) SE

Carton & Tewfik (2016) DC
McCarter et al. (2011b) SD

Note: BN, DC, SD, SE, and TCE are acronyms for the Behavioral Negotiation model, the Diversity Conflict model,
the Social Dilemma models, the Social Exchange model, and the Transaction Cost Economics model.
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